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Abstract: Recently, regulators as well market participants have raised serious concerns about the 
validity of external credit ratings in predicting true status of corporate default risk in India. This 
article seeks to compare historical rating trends in India along with the global benchmarks. CRAs 
need to provide more insight about corporate rating movements to enable banks to derive early 
warning signals about inherent credit risk. The kind of risk indicators need to be disclosed has 
been highlighted in this article.  
 
The external rating is an opinion of an independent external agency, which does not have a 
business interest or relationship with the borrower. The rating agency assesses the credit 
worthiness of the borrower or issuer based on a number of financial and non-financial aspects. 
Their role is to evaluate and quantify credit risks, within a context of effective benchmarking of 
risks across industries and countries. These metrics have evolved over a period and each rating 
agency has its own unique method of arriving at the credit rating. Credit ratings 
give investors/lenders an indication of a financial institution's/borrowers relative strength, 
the likelihood that it will default and fail to repay investors. It also enables the regulator to 
proactively monitor the shift in the portfolio risk positions over time. In India, investors as well 
as banks are questioning the validity of agency ratings since they are slow to react to market 
changes. The IL&FS crisis created a scare in the financial markets and short-term borrowings 
started drying up.  This is threatening to turn into a contagion, with many NBFCs facing a 
liquidity crisis. One of the biggest names in housing finance–Dewan Housing– is now being seen 
as a defaulter which was in investment category one year back. The IL&FS was given AAA 
rating by some of the leading Rating Agencies which was, all of a sudden, downgraded by nine 
notches to BB (which is a non-investment grade) when this Infrastructure Finance Company 
defaulted last year. It is therefore essential to specify the type of disclosures that CRAs will 
provide so that the market participants can properly read their signals.  
 
Extracting Corporate Risk Profile from Rating Trend 
Credit Rating Agencies in developed market provide valuable information about corporate credit 
risk profile. The transition matrices reported by S&P pro and Moody’s globally provides the 
profile of credit quality changes or migrations that have taken place for corporate credit portfolio 
between any two years that are selected. The rating transition matrix including probabilities to 
move from one rating to another rating represents the kernel of many credit risk and rating 
calculations. The leading two global rating agencies report their yearly migration analysis since 
1981 across various rating grades as well across industries. The yearly default rates across 
various portfolio segments (e.g. rating wise, industry wise, country wise) provide useful insight 
to benchmark a bank’s credit portfolio risk position. 
 
A weighted average from such rating transitions as reported by a leading global rating agency 
gives us the following matrix: 
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        Table 1: One year average global corporate rating transition, 1981-2018 
 IG NIG Default 
IG 93.06% 1.87% 0.09% 
NIG 2.26% 82.64% 3.66% 
Default 0.00% 0.00% 100% 
 Source: Estimated from Historical Rating Migration Data reported by a leading  
 US Rating Agency. 
 Note: Investment Grade (IG) category consists of rating notches AAA to BBB &  
 Non-Investment Grade (NIG) group represents notches: BBB-CCC 
 
As can be observed from the probability figures reported in table 1, 93.06% is the probability 
that a corporate begin the year as IG category remains in the same category at the end of the year 
as well. Similarly, 1.87% is the estimated probability that IG corporates will be downgraded to 
NIG category within a year. In the same logic, 2.26% is the probability that a NIG corporate will 
be upgraded to IG category within one year. In the same manner, the probability of default for IG 
category corporate is estimated as 0.09%. In comparison, the NIG rate corporate’s one year 
probability of default is significantly higher and it is estimated as 3.66%.   
 
Short-term vs. Long term view 
Unlike global agencies the leading CRAs operating in India do not provide granular information 
about such rating trends. Moreover, since agencies follow through the cycle (TTC) rating method 
that give importance to permanent components of the balance sheet (long term, 10 years trend of 
ratios), they are less reactive to changes in macroeconomic condition (De Servigny & Renault, 
2004). Hamilton (2002) has observed serial behavior to rating changes. That is, if rating changes 
in one direction, it tends to be followed by rating changes in the same direction. Companies that 
have been recently upgraded by rating agency are twice likely to be upgraded again in the 
subsequent year compared to companies that have either been downgraded or retained the same 
rating. Therefore, there is a central tendency in the CRAs' rating movements. Hence, investors 
may not get much early warning signals if they only look at the long run average rating transition 
matrix (1988-2019 for example) as reported by these agencies.  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to know how the migration pattern and the predictive accuracy of these 
ratings are changing over time and with varied macroeconomic condition. It is possible to extract 
yearly marginal probability of default (MPDs) from CRAs reported cumulative transition matrix. 
However, for this, one has to use the following mathematical expression than has been derived 
from the agencies’ computation methodology.  
 
;     Eq. (1a) 
 
where n is the symbol of time period; MPD=marginal probability of default & C=cumulative 
probability of default.  
 
This formula has been derived from the CRA’s methodology for estimating cumulative PDs for 
different time horizons which is obtained from historical yearly marginal PDs: 
CPD(n)=d(1)+d(2)×(1-d(1))+d(3)×(1-d(1))×(1-d(2))+….+d(n)
1−
∏
n
(1-d(n))     Eq. (1) 
where d(n): marginal probability of defaults or year default rates & n represents year.  
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To further illustrate the method, let us take a numerical example. Assume that the cumulative 
probability of default (CPD) of B-rated corporate issuers in 4th and 5th year of issuance (as 
reported by the agency) is 13.13% and 19.10% . Then using the above expression, the estimated 
MPD for the 5th year would be: 6.87%. Thus, if the Cohort year is 2006, the probability of 
default in 2011 for B rated corporate would be 6.87%.  
 
Applying this concept, and using equation 1, following PD forecast (Table 2) has been generated 
from a leading domestic CRA's cumulative default history.  
 
Table 2: Cumulative vs. Marginal PDs 
Rating % share CPDs Forward looking marginal PDs 
  1-year 2-year 3-year 2018 2019 2020 
AAA 1.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
AA 3.55% 0.02% 0.09% 0.18% 0.02% 0.07% 0.09% 
A 6.63% 0.20% 0.95% 1.91% 0.20% 0.75% 0.97% 
BBB 21.15% 0.86% 2.13% 3.83% 0.86% 1.28% 1.74% 
BB 34.76% 3.54% 7.47% 11.21% 3.54% 4.07% 4.04% 
B 31.36% 8.01% 15.91% 21.98% 8.01% 8.59% 7.22% 
C 1.11% 20.56% 33.64% 41.16% 20.56% 16.47% 11.33% 
Source: Computed from Historical Rating Migration Data reported by a leading  
 Domestic Rating Agency 
 
It is therefore suggested that for better transparency, CRAs should disclose year wise rating 
migration count (i.e. number of instruments rated in the beginning of the year and how many of 
them are retained in the same grade and go down to other grades including movement to default 
grade). Such information will enable the banks as well as investors to benchmark their asset 
portfolio and more prudently assess credit risk. Similarly, instead of reporting only absolute 
number of defaults across various industries, CRAs must provide industry default rates (i.e. 
number of accounts migrating from rated to default category over years). This will enable the 
banks and FIs to understand the nature of industry risk in their credit portfolio.  
 
Using a sample of published rating provided by a leading Rating Agency in India, we have 
constructed the following transition matrix: 
 
                 Table 3: One year average corporate rating transition in India, 2008-15 
 
 IG NIG Default 
IG 95.84% 3.50% 0.66% 
NIG 8.70% 79.71% 11.59% 
Default 0.00% 10.39% 89.61% 
        Source: Author’s own computation based on published long term rating of  
        364 corporates (open pool) 
 
One can notice from Table 3 probability estimates that the rating stability and default rate of 
domestic corporates is different from the global corporates. The domestic rating agency’s rating 
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is more volatile than the global agency mainly in the NIG category. Moreover, 10.39% of 
defaulted corporates are moved up to NIG category.  
 
It has been observed that even CRAs rating has cyclical behavior. During up-turn, many lower 
rated borrowers will move up to the rating scale. However, in macroeconomic stress situation, 
better rated corporates rating stability (mainly in Investment Grade segment) will sharply decline 
and as a result unexpected credit risk goes up in those situations. It has also been observed that 
during economic stress the percentage of rating withdrawals (i.e. rated to unrated) peaks up.  
 
Corporate Portfolio Position & Accuracy of Credit Ratings 
 
As can be observed from figures reported in table 4, there is a deterioration in the overall 
corporate credit portfolio quality in India. The shift is quite prominent since we have arranged 
them in time dimension. As can be seen that the share of investment graded borrowers has 
gradually been declined and there is an increase in the share of lower rated instruments. This also 
means that the median rating has moved to more risky grade. The rating accuracy which is 
measured by a statistical metric called Gini coefficient has also decreased over time. This implies 
that there is a significant deterioration in the discriminatory power of the agency rating in 
differentiating solvent corporates from the risky ones.  
 
Table 4: Grade-wise distribution of Corporate Borrowers in India 
 
Grades FY2008 FY2011 FY2018 
AAA 34.90% 1.40% 1.37% 
AA 35.64% 4.80% 5.99% 
A 16.25% 7.40% 9.84% 
BBB 7.50% 24.50% 37.90% 
BB 2.65% 29.90% 26.69% 
B 0.38% 20.00% 8.55% 
CCC/D 2.68% 12.00% 9.67% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Rating Accuracy 
(Gini Coefficient) 
0.82 
(1989-2008) 
0.63 
(1988-2011) 
0.46 
(1988-2018) 
Source: Compiled from Default studies of a leading CRA in India.  
Note: Higher the value of the Gini coefficient, greater is the accuracy of rating approach.  
 
Therefore, if banks base their internal credit risk analysis based on domestic external ratings 
only, they may underestimate their loan default risk and hence will be vulnerable to more 
volatility or shocks in their future business. This is primarily the reason why Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision (BCBS) in December 6, 2017 has advised banks to follow “due 
diligence” while using external agency rating in estimating credit risk weighted assets. For this, 
banks will have to develop strong credit rating culture and utilize the rating history to study their 
migration pattern. This has been included in EASE (Enhanced Access & Service Excellence) 
reform index to check the credit risk underwriting standards of public sector banks in India 
delineated by the Indian Bankers' Association (IBA).   
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It is important to note that many globally best practiced banks are using CRAs ratings for 
estimation of corporate credit risk weighted assets under the Basel II/III standardized approach. 
However, to more precisely estimate their expected credit loss (ECL) and internal capital for 
unexpected loss charge, banks are advised to use Internal Rating Based (IRB) Models provided 
they have enough data to derive the key risk drivers (such as probability of default, loss given 
default etc.).  
 
Concluding Suggestions 
An improved disclosures by domestic CRAs would immensely benefit the banking industry as 
well as the regulators to take a system level view of corporate credit risk position in India. A 
uniform PD benchmarks for each rating category as well as across industries will enable the 
lenders as well investors to take a portfolio view of credit risk. It is advised that our domestic 
agencies start publishing their monthly rating updates so that more sophisticated time series 
based early warning signal indicators can be constructed. Recently, Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI, 2019) has issued a set of wider disclosure norms for the CRAs to improve 
transparency in reporting the risk profile of the corporate entities. The industry will know which 
are the financial performance factors could trigger a rating change, upward or downward.  
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